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Abstract
Black-box web vulnerability scanners are a class of tools that can be used in finding security
vulnerabilities in web applications automatically regardless of server-side language implemen-
tation. These tools access a web application in the same way users do. Unfortunately, black-box
tools both commercial and open-source suffer from a number of limitations. In particular, ad-
vanced SQL Injection (SQLI) vulnerabilities and authentication protocol implementation flaws
are not currently detected by any of these tools. In this thesis, we propose two approaches to
handle the above limitations - SQLR(SQLi Revisited) and WeakAuthScan.
The SQL injection attack is one of the major threats to web applications. Through malicious
inputs, attackers can cause data leakage and damage, and even remote code execution on the
victim servers. Since SQL injection vulnerabilities are caused by malicious inputs, a common
solution is to use input sanitizers to filter out inputs that can result in SQL injection attacks. To
validate the correctness of SQL injection sanitizers, recent solutions model web application’s
sanitizers, and check the model with SQL injection attack patterns. However, the attack patterns
used by existing solutions only detect simple SQL injection attacks, which significantly limits
the power of their solutions. In this thesis, we propose a novel solution, SQLR, to validate
SQL sanitizers by systematically generating SQL injection attack patterns. Our approach uses
the SQL grammar to guide the enumeration of malicious SQL queries efficiently, and summa-
rizes the queries into patterns that can be used by existing solutions. In our evaluation, SQLR
identified new attack patterns and weaknesses in sanitizers used in several real-world web ap-
plications. Using our approach, we show that current web scanners are not effective in detecting
SQLi since they rely on generic attack patterns.
In practice, checking authentication protocol implementation is difficult due to lack of com-
plete implementation (such as missing source code of protocol participants). Using black-box
scanners, it is also difficult because the web applications require a user to create an account to
access the authentication system which these scanners fail to do it automatically. In this the-
sis, we present a framework WeakAuthScan to automatically extract the authentication protocol
logic. WeakAuthScan assumes no knowledge of the protocol being checked and does not require
access to the source code of the implementation. We propose a blackbox analysis by analyz-
ing messages between the authentication server and the web user. We evaluated our approach
on two popular websites which have millions of users sharing deeply personal information and
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Web applications have evolved considerably in terms of technology and functionality since the
advent of CGI-based technology in 1993. These web applications can dynamically construct
a web page in reply to each users request. Modern web applications provide rich, interactive
user experience and have already become prevalent around the world with the success of a wide
range of web services, such as on-line stores, e-commerce, social network services, etc.
As web technologies evolve, web applications have also been threatened by new security
attacks. For example, web applications designed to interact with back-end databases are threat-
ened by SQL injection [1]. Now-a-days, SQL injection attacks are becoming significantly more
popular amongst hackers, according to recent data between Q1 2012 and Q2 2012, there has
been an estimated 69 percent increase of this attack type [2].
Automated blackbox web vulnerability both commercial and open-source scanners have a
very important role on helping the developers to detect vulnerability in their applications. Over
the last few years, the web vulnerability scanner market has become a very active commercial
space, with, for example, more than 50 products approved for PCI compliance [3]. These scan-
ners test the security of the web applications by performing an attack, without malicious payload
(i.e. they will not delete parts of the web application or the database it uses), against the web
application that should be tested.
Web application scanners do have limitations. As most testing tools, they provide no guaran-
tee of soundness. In the last few years, several studies have shown that state-of-the-art web ap-
plication scanners fail to detect a significant number of vulnerabilities in test applications [4–6].
The main reason for these scanners to fail is because of limited attack vectors. These tools rely
on attack vectors which are constructed with known input patterns used in past web vulnerability
1
attacks.
Apart from this limitation, blackbox vulnerability scanners fail to detect vulnerabilities in au-
thentication protocol implementations. One important feature that is common to most web sites
is an authentication mechanism. Authentication protocols have historically been hard to design
correctly and implementations have been found susceptible to logical flaws [7] . Web authenti-
cation protocols are no exception - several of these implementations have been found insecure in
post deployment analysis [8–10]. Many web sites implement their own authentication protocols
and their authentication logic are hidden from the user. Because this is so prevalent, for scanners
to test if the authentication logic is implemented correctly they must properly handle authentica-
tion, possibly by creating accounts, logging in with valid credentials and, then check for imple-
mentation flaws in the authentication protocols. We say that the protocol is “weak”, because of
poorly implemented authentication logic at the server side which makes easy for an attacker to
bypass the authentication and we term such protocols as weak-authenticated (weak-auth) proto-
cols. Current blackbox vulnerability scanners fail to handle such authentication mechanism [5],
and therefore make them impossible to detect flaws in weak-auth protocols.
1.1 Research Overview
Our research is divided into two broad parts. First, we present SQLR (SQLi Revisited) to sys-
tematically validate input sanitizers of SQLi attacks.Second, we present a framework called
WeakAuthScan, a semi-automated method to validate flaws in the authentication protocol im-
plementations.
1.1.1 SQLR - SQLi Revisited
The root cause of SQLi vulnerabilities is the weaknesses in input validation, where the web ap-
plication fails to detect malicious user inputs that can result in unexpected SQL queries. There-
fore, a common solution is to check whether a user input used to generate SQL queries contains
pieces of SQL commands. This type of checking code is often referred to as input sanitizers (in
short, sanitizers). The main challenge faced by sanitizers is to detect all SQLi attack patterns,
especially the ones not commonly used in attacks.
In order to validate sanitizers and detect injection vulnerabilities in web applications, a naive
solution is to test the application with known input patterns used in past SQLi attacks using
black box vulnerability scanners. However, such testing-based solutions are not effective in
dealing with complex web applications, and thus often miss vulnerabilities. To make a more
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comprehensive analysis of the web applications, researchers have proposed solutions based on
program analysis and symbolic execution [11–13]. The main idea is to generate a model of
the web application’s input sanitizer, and validate the model against SQLi attack patterns. Al-
though such solutions have been shown to be effective in validating sanitizers and generating
new SQLi attacks, they are significantly limited by their simple SQLi attack patterns. For exam-
ple, the approach proposed by [13] only checks whether the input contains “'or 1=1”. A more
comprehensive set of attack patterns will help such approaches to detect more vulnerabilities.
Note that SQL injection attacks are caused by misinterpretation of inputs, i.e., user inputs
intended for data are interpreted as SQL commands. A malicious input will result in a different
parsing tree than benign inputs. This criteria have successfully been used as an effective detector
in various solutions to SQL attacks [14–17]. Consequently, focusing on the parsing module of
the database server is sufficient for generating SQLi patterns. Since the parsing module of the
SQL language is based on a context-free grammar, we will use the grammar to guide the SQLi
pattern generation. In essence, our SQLi attack pattern generation is based on systematically
enumerating SQL queries that can be accepted by the grammar.
Although enumerating strings from the language of a context-free grammar is straightfor-
ward, our solution faces a unique challenge: because the SQL queries in a web application are
generated by combining user inputs and command stubs, certain parts of the queries must be
fixed to given values, while other parts are derived from user inputs. We call this constraint the
taint1 constraint in the generated SQL commands. Our technique must be able to systematically
enumerate SQL queries under the taint constraint.
In this thesis, we present a novel approach, SQLR 2 discussed in Chapter 3, to systematically
validate input sanitizers of SQLi attacks. The key technique of our approach is the grammar-
guided generation of SQLi patterns. Using the SQL grammar as a guide, SQLR efficiently
enumerates malicious SQL statements satisfying the taint constraint, which are then summarized
into attack patterns. Once these attack patterns are combined with symbolic models of SQLi
sanitizers, our approach validates sanitizers through generating malicious inputs that can bypass
the sanitizers. We prototyped our approach and evaluated it using a number of real-world web
applications. Our evaluation results demonstrated that our approach is effective in validating
SQLi sanitizers and generating attack inputs.
Guided by the SQL grammar, SQLR discovered several new SQLi attack input patterns.
1Data derived from user inputs are often called “tainted”.
2SQLR stands for SQLi Revisited.
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Some of the patterns are even not meaningful to human. In our experiment, we verified that three
open source web scanners do not include the SQLi attack patterns generated by our approach,
and thus giving false negatives during vulnerability scanning.
In summary, we made the following contributions:
• We developed a complete solution to systematically validate SQLi attack sanitizers and gen-
erate SQLi attack inputs. To the best of our knowledge, SQLR is the first approach that uses
database grammar to guide sanitizer validation and SQLi vulnerability detection.
• We proposed a novel technique to use a context-free grammar to guide the efficient enumer-
ation of strings of the grammar under a taint constraint.
• Using our technique, we generated several new SQLi attack patterns. Our attack patterns can
be used by existing solutions for better validating SQLi sanitizers.
• We show that both open source and commercial current black-box web scanners attack pat-
tern is not complete.
1.1.2 WeakAuthScan
In practice, checking authentication protocols implementation is difficult due to lack of com-
plete implementation (such as missing source code of protocol participants). As discussed in
the introduction, blackbox scanners does not scale well for checking flaws in authentication pro-
tocols. The key challenges in ensuring that applications authenticate and federate user identities
securely is checking the implementations of authentication logic. Using blackbox scanning, it is
difficult due to lack of complete information (missing source code of authentication logic) and
also the web applications require a user to create an account to access the authentication system
which these scanners fails to do it automatically [5].
In this thesis, we present a framework WeakAuthScan to automatically extract the authen-
tication protocols logic. WeakAuthScan assumes no knowledge of the protocol being checked
and does not require access to the source code of the implementation. We propose a blackbox
analysis by exchanging messages between the authentication server and the web user.
We apply WeakAuthScan to study real-world web sites. We tested on two popular websites
which implement their authentication logic and have millions of users sharing deeply personal
information. WeakAuthScan successfully recovers the authentication logic and reports security
flaws in these implementation without their knowledge.
In summary, we made the following main contributions:
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• First, we propose automatic technique to extract the authentication protocols from the mes-
sages exchanged between the server and the user. Our approach works with little user inputs
and without requiring any knowledge of the protocol.
• Second, we apply our approach to two real-world web sites and we were successfully able to
find security flaws in the implemented authenticated protocols.
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Chapter 2
Web Application Vulnerability and
Black Box Scanners
In this chapter, we begin by describing the software architecture of the black-box web vulner-
ability scanners. We then discuss the vulnerability categories mainly, SQL Injection and Weak
Authentication Systems, which they fail to detect.
2.1 Web Vulnerability Black Box Scanners
Black-box web vulnerability scanners are a class of tools that can be used to identify security
vulnerabilities in web applications. These tools evaluate the security of web applications auto-
matically with little or no human support. These tools access a web application in the same way
users do, and, therefore, have the advantage of being independent of the particular technology
used to implement the web application.
Black-box testing consists of analysis of the program execution from an external point-of-
view without actually looking into the source code. In short, it consists of exercising the software
and comparing the execution outcome with the expected result. Testing is probably the most
widely used technique for verification and validation of software. There are several levels for
applying black-box testing, ranging from unit testing to integration testing and system testing. In
this thesis, penetration testing that are black-box testing refers to a methodology where an ethical
hacker has no knowledge of the system being tested. The goal of a black-box penetration test is
to simulate an external hacking or cyber warfare attack and report if there is any vulnerabilities
in the web application.
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2.1.1 Black-Box Penetration testing
Black-Box Penetration testing, consists of the analysis of the program execution in the presence
of malicious inputs, searching for potential vulnerabilities. In this approach the scanners does
not know the internal working of the web application and it uses fuzzing techniques over the
web HTTP requests. The scanner needs no knowledge of the implementation details and tests
the inputs of the application from the user point of view. The number of tests can reach hundreds
or even thousands for each vulnerability type. These penetration tools provide an automatic way
to search for vulnerabilities avoiding the repetitive and tedious task of doing hundreds or even
thousands of tests by hand for each vulnerability type. Despite the use of automated tools, in
many situations it is not possible to test all possible input streams, as that would take too much
time. So, as soon as software specifications are complete, test cases can be designed to have the
biggest coverage and representativeness possible. This test approach may leave program paths
untested and can lead to unnecessary repetition of tests between developers and testers. The
most common automated security testing tools used in web applications are generally referred
to as web security scanners (or web vulnerability scanners). Web security scanners are often
regarded as an easy way to test applications against vulnerabilities. These scanners have a
predefined set of tests cases that are adapted to the application to be tested, saving the user from
define all the tests to be done. In practice, the user only needs to configure the scanner and let
it test the application. Once the test is completed the scanner reports existing vulnerabilities
(if any detected). Most of these scanners are commercial tools, but there are also some free
application scanners often with limited use, since they lack most of the functionalities of their
commercial counterparts.
Three very popular commercial security scanners and also the leader in the market which
support web services testing are Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanners [18], HP WebInspect [19]
and IBM Rational Appscan [20].
2.1.2 Commercial Tools
HP WebInspect is a tool that performs web application security testing and assessment for
today’s complex web applications, built on emerging Web 2.0 technologies. “HP WebInspect
delivers fast scanning capabilities, broad security assessment coverage and accurate web ap-
plication security scanning results [19]. This tool includes pioneering assessment technology,
including simultaneous crawl and audit (SCA) and concurrent application scanning. It is a broad
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application that can be applied for penetration testing in web-based applications.
IBM Rational AppScan “is a leading suite of automated Web application security and com-
pliance assessment tools that scan for common application vulnerabilities” [20]. This tool is
suitable for users ranging from non-security experts to advanced users that can develop exten-
sions for customized scanning environments. IBM Rational AppScan can be used for penetra-
tion testing in web applications, including web services.
Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner “is an automated web application security testing
tool that audits a web applications by checking for exploitable hacking vulnerabilities” [18] .
Acunetix WVS can be used to execute penetration testing in web applications or web services
and is quite simple to use and configure. The tool includes numerous innovative features, for
instance the AcuSensor Technology.
Many other black-box tools were proposed in the past. Although those works target web
applications, and not web services, we introduce some here due to the relevant innovations they
introduced.
2.1.3 Free/Open Source Tools
w3af
w3af is the abbreviation of the Web Application Attack and Audit Framework [21]. It is an open-
source program, written in Python. It uses plug-ins to perform the attacks on web applications.
A description of the vulnerabilities that these plug-ins claim to detect can be found on the tool’s
website . It uses a menu-driven text-based structure, but it also has a GUI.
wapiti
wapiti is another open-source program written in Python [22]. It works from the command-line
completely automatically. However, command-line options can be used to customize scanning.
sqlmap
sqlmap is open-source penetration testing tool [23] that automates the process of detecting and
exploiting SQL injection flaws.
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1 <?
2 $name = $_POST['username'];
3 $sql = "SELECT * FROM user_table WHERE username='".$username."'";
4 if (!preg_match("/ OR /",$username)){
5 $result = $db->sql_query($sql);
6 }
7 ?>
Figure 2.1: Example code with an SQLi vulnerability.
2.2 SQL Injection Attack and Input Sanitizers
2.2.1 SQL Injection
Web applications are commonly implemented by a multi-tiered architecture. For example, in a
three-tiered web application, the application server receives requests from users and generates
SQL statements to query the database server. An SQL injection (SQLi) attack occurs when an
attacker changes the intended effect of an SQL query by inserting SQL keywords or operators
into the query, which gives attackers unauthorized access to data stored in the database.
Consider the code fragment shown in Figure 2.1. This code retrieves details of a user account.
We will use this code throughout the paper to illustrate how SQLR works. Initially, at line 2,
the variable $name is assigned to values from the POST parameter, which contains user inputs.
Line 3 prepare the SQL query to the database. At line 4, we check if the user input $username
contains the keyword “OR”. If not, it sends the query to the database server (Line 5); otherwise,
this query will not be executed. This is a simple check of SQLi attempts. However, if the check
cannot cover all possible SQLi cases, this program is still vulnerable.
2.2.2 Input Sanitizer
To prevent malicious SQLi inputs, the program has to ensure that the query executed in the
database server is intended by the program. Because inputs from malicious users may contain
arbitrary values, a common solution is to add code, such as line 4 in Figure 2.1, to check user
inputs and detect SQLi attempts, a process often referred to as input sanitizing. The code for
input sanitizing is called input sanitizers, or sanitizers in short. Many scripting languages pro-
vide built-in sanitizers, such as trim,mysql real escape string in PHP. Alternatively,
programmers can build their own sanitizers.
2.2.3 Current Solutions to Validate Sanitizers
The safety of a web application depends on the quality of input sanitizers. Recently, a few
techniques [11, 12, 24, 25] have been proposed to check the correctness of sanitizers and detect
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SQLi attacks. They analyze web application source code, and check whether a web application
fails to sanitize inputs using patterns describing known attack patterns.
These solutions are limited by the available attack patterns. For example, some of the so-
lutions only check the existence of a few SQL keywords “OR”, “UNION SELECT”, “HAVING”,
and “ORDER BY” [12, 13, 25]. Sanitizers passing the check using such patterns will not prevent
attacks using other patterns, especially when an attack pattern is previously unknown.
In Figure 2.1, line 4 is the input sanitizer. Whether an approach can successfully detect the
weakness of this sanitizer depends on the attack patterns available to the approach. In this paper,
we present a technique to systematically generate more attack patterns, which can be used by
existing solutions to validate the sanitizers. Recent approaches [13,24] generate sanitizers from
known attack patterns. Our attack patterns can be used by these approaches to generate more
complete sanitizers.
2.3 Weak Authentication Systems
Web authentication mechanisms are fast evolving. Many web sites implement their own authen-
tication protocols and manage their authentication logic either from third party mechanism or by
itself. Most of the web sites implement AutoAuth (Automatic Authentication) mechanism [26]
which allows users to automatically log in to your server. For example “you might use it if
you have another software on your website which clients already log into, and once they have
logged into that you don’t want them to have to re-authenticate again separately to access the
server”. The way it works is by constructing a special URL to redirect the user to the server,
which verifies and if valid, activates the users login session in the server automatically. One
advantage using the mechanism it that it skips the need to know the users password to access
the users account.
The security comes from having a key/nonce that is shared only between you and the third
party code/server you’re making the request to, and only knowing that this key allows an au-
toauth request to be constructed for your server. Generating the key/nonce is the important
component involved in the security of AutoAuth. If attacker is able to guess this key then the




2.4.1 SQLi attack detection.
Several solutions have been developed to detect injection attacks [14–17]. They detect an attack
by checking whether user inputs make the generated command’s parsing tree different from that
of the intended command. This idea is also used by our approach as the basis of malicious
query generation. However, instead of detecting attacks when they happen, our approach aims
to generate attack patterns and validate sanitizers.
SQLi vulnerability detection and sanitizer validation.
A few approaches in this category is based on static analysis of web application code. The basic
technique is either to use static analysis to identify program locations that generate queries from
user inputs [27–29], or to perform string analysis to model the queries outputted by the web
application [30, 31].
Using such basic techniques, researchers proposed several techniques to discover SQLi vul-
nerabilities. Wassermann and Su [32] present a fully automated approach to detect subtle SQLi
flaws. Adrilla [12] uses the input-generation component from Apollo [33] to generate SQLi
attacks automatically. The Apollo input generator is based on systematic dynamic test-input
generation that combines concrete and symbolic execution [34]. Saner [11] combines static
and dynamic analysis to find cross-site scripting (XSS) and SQLi vulnerabilities by validating
the sanitizer functions in web applications. Saner focuses on the sanitizing process and creates
attack vectors by looking into the static dependency graph. Wassermann et al. developed a
tool [35] that executes a PHP applications on a concrete input and collects symbolic constraints.
They use dynamic test input generation to find attacks on full PHP web applications. Their tool
performs source-code instrumentation and backward-slice computation by re-executing and in-
strumenting additional code. Upon reaching an SQL statement, their tool attempts to create an
input that exposes SQL injection vulnerability, by using a string analysis [30].
Solutions in this category analyzes the web application code to detect SQLi vulnerabilities.
In contrast, our approach analyzes the database using the grammar as a guide to systematically
generate attack patterns. Our approach has complementary advantage to solutions in this cate-
gory, generating new attack patterns to enhance such solutions.
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2.4.2 Web application sanitizer generation.
BEK [24] is a language for modeling string transformations. It is used for writing sanitizers
that enable systematic reasoning about their correctness. Another solution [36] develops an
automatic system that, given a template and a library of sanitizers, automatically sanitizes each
untrusted input with a sanitizer that matches the context in which it is rendered.
For adding sanitizers in web applications, the places where untrusted data appear in the code
are hard to find. Even when they are found, it is not immediately clear which sanitizer should
be used. To answer such questions, Weinberger et al. [37] did a formal study of common XSS
sanitizing mechanisms, where they present a model of the web browser’s parsing internals to
explain the subtleties in XSS sanitizing.
2.4.3 Evaluating Web Vulnerability Scanners
Many researchers have assessed web vulnerability scanners, tested their performances, ana-
lyzed their behavior and gave details about the limitations identified [4–6]. Now-a-days they are
growing body of literature on the evaluation of web vulnerability scanners. [38] implemented
automated black-box web vulnerability scanners which generates more effective test cases tar-
geting SQLI and XSS vulnerabilities. But these test cases are limited to known attack patterns
and fails to detect SQLi attack if new attack pattern exists. They developed a new web vulner-
ability scanner and tested it on about 25,000 live web pages. Since no ground truth is available
for these sites, the authors cannot discuss false negative rate or failures of their tool. [39] tested
four web scanners on 300 web services but they report high rates of false positives and false
negatives. [4–6] evaluated commercial web scanner and reports that none of the scanners report
all the vulnerabilities present in the web application.
[40] compared three scanners against three different applications. To measure the effective-
ness of each scanner they used code coverage and other metrics. In the follow-up study [41],
the same authors assessed seven scanners and compared their detection capabilities and the time
taken by each scanner to report the vulnerabilies in the web application. [42] assessed five un-




Grammar-guided Validation of SQL
Injection Sanitizers
SQL injection (SQLi) attacks are an important class of attacks on web applications. Commonly
implemented by a three-tiered architecture, a web application executes its core business logic
in the application server, and stores its data in the back-end database server. The application
server receives requests from the user and interacts with the database server by generating SQL
commands. In an SQLi attack, attackers inject malicious database queries through an input,
causing data leakage and damage in the database. For the convenience to generate such SQL
commands from user inputs and command stubs, weak-typed scripting languages, such as Perl
and PHP, are widely used in building web applications. However, the convenience often results
in SQLi vulnerabilities.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the root cause of SQLi vulnerabilities is the weaknesses in input
validation. Therefore, a common solution is to use input sanitizers (refer Chapter 2). One of the
main challenges faced by sanitizer is to detect all SQLi attack patterns, especially the ones not
commonly used in attacks.
To test the effectiveness of these sanitizers often developers execute penetration tests on them.
As numerous developers are not specialized on security, the common way to search for security
vulnerabilities in the sanitizers is through blackbox web vulnerability scanners.
In this chapter, we present SQLR, a tool to systematically validate the input sanitizers of SQLi
attacks. Section 3.1 gives an overview of our solution. Section 3.2 presents the key technique,
grammar-guided SQLi attack pattern generation. Section 3.3 describes details of the implemen-
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Figure 3.1: Overview of SQLR.
tation of our approach. We show the evaluation result in Section 3.4.
3.1 Overview of Our Solution
Figure 3.1 illustrates the overview of our approach, which consists of four main components:
symbolic analyzer, SQLi query enumerator, sanitizer validator, and pattern generator.
The symbolic analyzer component analyzes the web application to identify the queries gener-
ated by the web application as symbolic strings, for example, “SELECT * FROM user table
WHERE username=SymbolicPart”, where SymbolicPart denotes the part derived from user
inputs. It also outputs a model of the web application’s input sanitizer. The SQLi query enu-
merator component uses the symbolic queries and the SQL grammar to enumerate all possible
malicious SQL queries that can be generated by the application. The malicious SQL queries and
the model of sanitizer are used by the sanitizer validator, which verifies whether the sanitizer
can successfully detect all malicious SQL queries. Finally, to benefit existing solutions in san-
itizer validation, the pattern generator summarizes the generated malicious queries into regular
expression patterns that can be used by those solutions.
One of the key component of SQLR is the SQLi query enumerator. It uses the SQL grammar
to guide the enumeration of malicious SQL queries. We will describe this component in the
following section.
14
3.2 Grammar Guided Generation of SQLi Attack Patterns
The key technique of our approach, SQLR, is to use the SQL grammar to guide the generation
of SQLi attack patterns. Because the SQLi attack queries are generated by the web appli-
cation, they must be instances of a symbolic string, such as “SELECT * FROM user table
WHERE username=SymbolicPart” for the code in Figure 2.1. Note that the SQL grammar is
a context-free grammar, so we define the problem as follows:
Problem definition: Given a context-free grammar G, a symbolic string S, our goal is to
efficiently enumerate concrete instances of S from G’s language, where each enumerated string
has a unique parsing tree.
In the context of SQL queries generated by web applications, being an instance of S (the
symbolic query) ensures that the enumerated strings are possible queries of the web application.
Requiring each query to have a unique parsing tree ensures that the enumerated strings are
malicious SQL queries.
3.2.1 Challenges
A straightforward solution is to use a top-down method on the grammar G to enumerate all
strings ofG, without considering the symbolic string S and the requirement for different parsing
tree. Specifically, we begin with the start symbol of the grammar G, and recursively substitute
non-terminals according to the productions of G. After a string is enumerated, we then check
whether it is an instance of S and its parsing tree is different from previously enumerated strings.
However, this solution is not efficient: it enumerates a large amount of strings that do not satisfy
the two requirements (being instance of the symbolic string and having a unique parsing tree).
Since the generated strings are instances of the symbolic string S, they have common con-
crete parts, i.e., substrings with non-symbolic values. As an example, in the code shown in
Figure 2.1, the generated SQL queries have the prefix “SELECT * FROM user table WHERE
username = '”. We can leverage those concrete parts and the internal states of the grammar
to make input enumeration more efficient. Intuitively, we can start with parsing the common
prefix using the SQL grammar, and identify the grammar’s “internal state” led to by the prefix.
Continuing from that state, we enumerate SQL queries that result in a different parsing tree. In
this way, we avoid generating lots of SQL queries that do not satisfy the two requirements.
We illustrate our approach using a simple grammar shown in Figure 3.2. This grammar is a
simplified version of the SQL grammar. We apply LALR(1) parsing to generate a parsing table,
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1 oneselect ::= SELECT STAR from where_opt SEMI (R0)
2 from ::= FROM ID (R1)
3 where_opt ::= WHERE expr (R2)
4 expr ::= expr EQ expr (R3)
5 expr ::= expr AND expr (R4)
6 expr ::= ID (R5)
Figure 3.2: A simple SQL-like grammar







6 R2 S4 S5
7 R3 R3 R3
8 R4 R4 R4






Table 3.1: Parsing table of the sample grammar.
shown in Table 3.1.
In a query generated by the program shown in Figure 2.1, e.g., “SELECT * FROM user table
WHERE username='alice'”, its prefix “SELECT * FROM user table WHERE username='”
is lexically recognized as terminal nodes defined by the grammar: SELECT STAR FROM ID
WHERE ID EQ. This prefix drives the LALR(1) parsing process to the state 4 of its parsing
table (Table 3.1). From this state, if we make the rest of parsing steps different from those of
the original query, we get a query of different parsing tree, but with same prefix.
If we represent the relationship of the states in the LALR(1) parsing table into a state graph,
whose nodes are the states and edges are shift operations, each parsing tree corresponds to a path
in the graph. To get a different parsing tree, we need to find a different path in the graph. Using
the previous example “SELECT * FROM user table WHERE username=SymbolicPart”,
the concrete prefix “SELECT * FROM user table WHERE username='” will lead a path to
state 4 in the parsing tree. To find different path in the parsing graph, we look for different
shift operations leading out of state 4. We thus see a shift operation to state 9 on ‘ID’.
This requires the SymbolicPart begins with ’ID’. In this way, we will enumerate a string of the
grammar, which leads down a unique path.
However, not all paths from the start state to the accept state in the state graph correspond to
valid strings of the grammar G. The challenge is in minimizing such invalid paths during path
selection. We achieve this by optimizing the state graph.










































































Figure 3.3: Shift-Reduce Graph and Final Graph
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but our technique can be applied to other context-free grammars as well.
3.2.2 Optimizing SQL Parsing Graph
For easier presentation and illustration, we represent the parsing table into an equivalent state
graph. We then present our technique to optimize the state graph to reduce the number of paths
during path enumeration.
First, we construct a shift-reduce graph from the parsing table. The shift-reduce graph is
constructed by looking at all the shift and reduce operation in the parsing table. We create a
state in the shift-reduce graph for each state in the parsing table. If there is a shift operation
from state s to another state s′, we add an edge from between state s and s′ in the shift-reduce
graph. If there is a reduce operation on state s we look for its corresponding rule from the
grammar. From state s, we backtrack to number of symbols present on the right hand side of the
rule to reach state s′ and label its corresponding edge with the reduce operation. The complete
shift-reduce graph for the sample grammar is shown in Figure 3.3(a).
To reduce the number of paths, we further optimize the shift-reduce graph, converting the
shift-reduce graph into the final graph by removing the non-terminals. To do this, we need
to handle reduce operations in the graph, since all the reduce operation depends on the non-
terminal symbol. In our approach, when we see a reduce operation on state s, we look into the
corresponding rule from the grammar. The grammar will tell us how many symbols it has on
the right hand side, using this we can backtrack to that particular state. Once we backtrack, we
go to a new state(s′) with a corresponding outgoing edge that matches the right-hand rule of
the grammar. This is how shift-reduce graph is created. Now, to construct the final graph we
look into the state s′ and see its outgoing edge which matches the left hand side of the grammar
corresponding to the reduce operation to reach a new state s′′. Finally, we add an edge from
state s to state s′′ and label its corresponding edge with the reduce operation. For example, in
the shift-reduce graph on state 7, we see a reduce operation ‘R3’ which goes to state 3. On
state 3, when it sees a non-terminal ‘expr’ it goes to state 6. This symbol matches with
the reduce operation ‘R3’(left hand side of the grammar). Therefore, removing the edge from
state 3 to state 6 and adding an edge from state 7 to state 6 will contain the same
behavior as the reduce operation. In this way, all the non-terminal labeled edges are removed.
The final graph representation of the parsing table is shown in Figure 3.3(b).
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3.2.3 Enumerating Queries through Symbolic Analysis of the Final Graph
Algorithm 1 Symbolic analysis on the final graph
Input: Starting node: N , Starting stack: S, Accepting state A, Graph G, Threshold threshold
Output: Query set Q
1: L = ∅
2: lookahead = >
3: q = null
4: let M be an empty stack
5: E = get out going edges(N)
6: for all e ∈ E do
7: push 〈e, S, null, 0,>〉 into M
8: end for
9: while |M | > 0 do
10: 〈e, S, q, n, l〉 = pop(M)
11: lookaheade == get lookahead(e)
12: if lookaheade ∩ l == ∅ then
13: continue;
14: end if
15: if e is an shift edge then
16: l′ = >
17: S′ = shift update stack(e, S)
18: else {e is a reduce edge}
19: if S is not consistent with the reduce then
20: continue;
21: end if
22: l′ = lookaheade ∩ l
23: S′ = reduce update stack(e, S)
24: end if
25: dst = get dst(e)
26: q′ = q@get terminal(e)
27: if dst == A then
28: Q = Q ∪ {q′}
29: end if
30: if n < threshold then
31: E = get out going edges(dst)
32: for all e′ ∈ E do




Once the final graph representation of the SQL grammar is ready, we will carry out symbolic
analysis on the final graph to enumerate inputs.
The algorithm for symbolic analysis using the final graph is shown in Algorithm 1. The inputs
of the algorithm include the final graph G, a starting node N , a starting stack S, an accepting
state A and a threshold threshold. Recall that our goal is to enumerate all valid SQL queries
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matching a symbolic query. Suppose the constant prefix of the symbolic query is pre, after
parsing pre, we record the state N and the parsing stack S. The output Q of Algorithm 1 is a set
of partial queries. When concatenated with the constant prefix pre, each partial query represents
one valid SQL query.
In Algorithm 1, we use @ to denote string concatenation. The destination node of a directed
edge e can be obtained using get dst(e). We use get terminal(e) and get lookahead(e) to
get the terminal symbol and lookahead symbol set associated with an edge e correspondingly.
Algorithm 1 traverses graphG in a depth-first fashion to find all valid queries. It uses stackM
to maintain untraversed edges. Each stack element in M consists of an shift/reduce edge e, an
parsing stack status S, a partial query q, number of traversed edges n and a lookahead symbol set
l. The edge e is used for depth-first traversal, other information maintained in stack are explained
in the following. In addition to standard depth-first traversal, we do several additional checks
to avoid generating redundant queries and also to guarantee generating only valid queries. To
rule out invalid queries, we maintain the parsing stack when traversing the graph G. The initial
state of the parsing stack is given as the input S of Algorithm 1. Whenever we traverse an
edge, the stack is maintained correspondingly (line 17,23). When we traverse a reduce edge, we
check whether the reduce operation is consistent with the current stack status. A reduce edge
inconsistent with current stack status is never traversed (line 19-21).
We also keep track of the assumptions on lookahead symbols (l in each stack element) to
avoid redundant graph traversal. Our graph is built based on the parsing table of LALR(1)
grammar. LALR(1) parsing uses one lookahead symbol to determine the next parsing action.
An action can only be taken if the next to-be-parsed symbol matches the lookahead terminal
of that action. Mapping to our graph, an edge can only be traversed if the next to-be-parsed
symbol matches the lookahead symbol of that edge. However, the next to-be-parsed terminal
is unknown to us since we are enumerating all queries instead of parsing one concrete query.
Therefore, when we take an edge, we are essentially making the assumption that the next sym-
bol (lookahead symbol) is consistent with the edge. When we traverse a path consisting of
several edges, the assumptions for all edges have to be consistent. The check for consistency
on lookahead terminals are in line 11-14. For example, when we take the edge from state
8 to state 6 in Figure 3.3(b), we make the assumption that the next coming symbol is in
{SEMI,EQ,END}. When we later take the shift edge from state 6 to state 4, we check
whether the symbol being shifted in falls into the set {SEMI,EQ,END}. Since the symbol is
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EQ, which is in the set, the edge from state 6 to state 4 can be traversed.
The number n in each stack element ofM is used to control the length of the generated query.
We only continue exploration if n is less than threshold. When we reach the accept state A, we
output one partial query q. Because we only consider the concrete prefix of the symbolic query
in the previous steps, we need to check whether the generated query matches other parts of the
symbolic query.
Handling multiple symbolic parts. If there multiple symbolic parts in the symbolic query, all
the symbolic parts should be used together to guide the enumeration in the ideal solution. We
can use our approach to explore one symbolic part at a time. It works when there is no de-
pendency among the symbolic parts, which is typical for generated SQL queries. Moreover, a
property of SQLi attacks makes the problem easier to handle. In SQLi attacks, attackers typical
inject SQL pieces in the first symbolic part of the SQL query and comment out the rest of the
query. Here is an example:
Symbolic query:
SELECT * FROM user table WHERE username=<symbolic part>
AND password=<symbolic part>;
After SQL injection:
SELECT * FROM user table WHERE username='' OR 1 = 1; --
AND password=<symbolic part>;
In the above query, we see that attackers have to inject SQL conditions in the first symbolic
part and comment out the second symbolic part, which is necessary to produce a tautology.
Therefore, we need to mainly focus on the first symbolic part of the symbolic query. If we fail
to generate a malicious query for the first symbolic part we then focus on the second or the next
symbolic part in the query.
3.2.4 Generation of SQLi Attack Patterns
Once we have enumerated queries for a given symbolic query, the next step is to create an attack
pattern out of it. These patterns will be used by existing solutions to validate sanitizers.
The attack patterns with similar behavior or structure is grouped together. Based on the
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longest common substrings, the enumerated queries are clustered into families. For each cluster
obtained, we learn the regular expressions from that family. In previous approaches [12,13], the
attack patterns are based on tautology, which makes one or more conditional statements in the
query always true. Therefore, only one attack pattern is used by those approaches:
SELECT ID FROM ID WHERE ID EQ STRING OR INTEGER EQ INTEGER
In our case, since we generate more number of attack patterns, we use longest common substring
to group them into different clusters as shown below:
1 SELECT ID FROM ID WHERE ID EQ EXISTS ..
2 SELECT ID FROM ID WHERE ID EQ MINUS PLUS EXISTS ..
3 SELECT ID FROM ID WHERE ID EQ STRING ..
4 SELECT ID FROM ID WHERE ID EQ STRING LE ID HAVING ..
5 SELECT ID FROM ID WHERE ID EQ STRING PLUS MINUS EXISTS ..
Each cluster contains a set of malicious queries that can be used to exploit the program. In
Section 3.4, we discuss the attack patterns in detail.
3.2.5 Discussion of Path Sensitivity and Over Approximation
As mentioned earlier, SQL parsing tree provides a good oracle for checking SQL injection
attacks. It is worth noting that this checking is specific to a path in the web application. Let v
be an variable whose value is SQL query sent to the database. Suppose when executing with
input t, v gets a benign query q1. Let t′ be another input that follows the same path as the path
of t. When executing the application with input t′, v gets the value q2. If q1 and q2 has different
parsing tree, then q2 must be malicious. This assertion is based on the fact that the two queries q1
and q2 are derived from the same program path in the application. Therefore, any difference in
parsing tree is unexpected. However, if q1 and q2 are derived from different program paths in the
application, the above assertion does not hold anymore. When derived from different program
paths, the different parsing tree of q1 and q2 could be due to different ways of computing v along
the two different paths instead of malicious query injection.
Given a variable v, in our implementation we compute the over-approximation of all possible
values of v along all program paths using Algorithm 1. Different program paths are not distin-
guished. Hence, when we find an SQL query that has different parsing tree from the parsing
tree of the reference benign query, it might be a false positive. To remove those false positives,
we validate whether a query is indeed malicious after it is generated.
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cfg temp0 := |temp2 ;
cfg temp1 := temp5 \079;
cfg temp2 := |temp6 \044| temp2 \044| temp5 \044 |temp1 \044;
cfg temp3 := \001|\002|.. ..|\251|\252;
cfg temp4 := \001|\002|.. ..|\251|\252;
cfg temp5 := temp2 ;
cfg temp6 := temp6 temp8 |temp2 temp10 |temp5 temp4 |temp1 temp3 ;
cfg temp7 := "SELECT * FROM user_table WHERE username="\044;
cfg temp8 := \001|\002|.. ..|\251|\252;
cfg temp9 := temp7 temp6 \044|temp7 temp5 \044|temp7 temp1 \044|temp7 temp0 \044;
cfg temp10 := \001|\002|.. ..|\251|\252;
Figure 3.4: Context-free grammar for code in Figure 2.1
3.3 Implementation
In this section, we discuss the implementation details of our approach, SQLR as well as tech-
niques we used for optimizing our approach.
3.3.1 Symbolic Analyzer of Web Applications
In this component, we model the sanitizing procedure using techniques from static taint analysis
with string analysis. Existing solutions model sanitizers using various methods, such as DFA
with transducers or symbolic execution. In our approach, given a PHP web application, we use
PHPSA [30], a string analyzer for PHP programs, to represent the sanitizing procedure S into a
context free grammar GS , whose language is exactly the set of strings that can pass S. PHPSA
takes two inputs: the PHP web application and an input specification that describes the set of
possible inputs to the program (POST parameters).
To illustrate the string analysis, let us consider the example code in Figure 2.1, which contains
a regular expression based sanitizing code. The input specification defined for the example is
$ POST['username'] = [/.*/]
which says, the input expects any arbitrary value. Using the two inputs to PHPSA, we generate
the grammar shown in Figure 3.4.
The string analyzer supports only limited functions from PHP standard library, that is, it does
not support all features for PHP language. Currently we manually approximate unsupported
lines of PHP code and verify that the changes do not affect the sanitizing process. We will add
support for these features using the approach discussed in [32].
23
3.3.2 Multiple Query Generation
Some of the SQLi attacks contain a combination of two or more queries to make the attack
effective. Such kind of attacks are called piggy-backed queries. Among SQLi attacks, this type
of attack is one of the most dangerous and harmful attacks [25]. The intention of such kind
of attack is to extract data, to add or modify data, to perform denial of service, and to execute
remote commands.
In the example of Figure 2.1, if the attacker inputs “'; DROP TABLE user table;”
into the user-name field, the application generates the query:
SELECT * FROM user table WHERE username='';
DROP TABLE user table --';
After completing the first intended query, the database recognizes the query delimiter (“;”)
and executes the injected second query, which drops the table user table. The same attack
technique can also be used to insert new users into the database or cause denial of service attack
by using ‘SHUTDOWN’ command.
To generate multiple queries or piggy-backed queries, we need to add a rule to the database
grammar that parses the graph again from the starting node by adding an edge from the accept




Once we generate the attack patterns to describe SQLi attempts, as well as the symbolic mod-
els of the sanitizer, our next step is to validate the sanitizing routine. We use Hampi [43], a
solver for constraints over fixed-size string variables. Hampi constraints may contain a fixed-
size string variable, context-free language definitions, regular language definitions and opera-
tions, and language-membership predicates. Hampi can be used in finding a string from the
intersection of a bounded context-free language (CFL) and a regular language (RL). In our case,
the CFL contains all possible string that can pass the sanitizer and RL represent a set of valid
queries generated from the enumeration process. If Hampi finds a string, it means that the string
is present in both the CFL and RL.
In our approach, the query generated using the grammar is represented into regular lan-
guage(RL) as shown below
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1 reg Idchar := or(['0'-'9'], ['a'-'z'],['A'-'Z']);
2 reg Id := concat(Idchar, star(Idchar));
3 reg Query := concat("SELECT ",\042," FROM user_table WHERE username='",Id,"' LE ",Id,"
HAVING ",Id," EQ ",Id);
Given a set of regular languages, in our case the queries generated from the grammar and
the context free language of the sanitizer, Hampi outputs a string if the intersection between the
CFL and RL is not empty, otherwise reports that the intersection is empty. The string which
Hampi outputs is an instance of attacks to bypass that sanitizer. For example, solving the CFL
defined in Figure 3.4 and the regular language above, Hampi outputs the following string,
aa ' LE 2 HAVING 1 EQ 1
The above string is the attack pattern for the sanitizing function defined in Figure 2.1. Finally,
the malicious input generated for that program is
aa ' < 2 HAVING 1 = 1
Therefore, we say that Figure 2.1 is vulnerable to SQLi attack.
3.3.4 Proactive Pruning of Blocked Queries
When a non-trivial sanitizer is applied in the web application, most of the generated queries
could not pass the sanitizer and would be pruned away in the last step. To reduce the time
cost by generating these queries, we proactively prune queries that cannot pass the sanitizer
functions.
Given a program variable v whose value is SQL query, we over-approximate all the queries
that v can hold using the approach mentioned in Section 3.3.1. Let Lv be the set of all queries
that v can hold. Note that Lv already takes sanitizer into consideration. In earlier sections, we
have described how to systematically enumerate all possible queries accepted by the database.
The generated queries are in the form of token sequences. For example, SELECT STAR FROM
ID WHERE ID EQ ID SEMI. Each token is a regular expression defined by the specification
of SQL grammar. Therefore, each sequence of tokens represents a set of concrete SQL queries
instead of only one query. Suppose by enumerating the SQL grammar, we generate several sets
of queries in the form of token sequences {q1, q2, . . . , qn}. We use L(qi) to represent the set
of concrete queries that qi contains. In our earlier approach, we only check Lv ∩ L(qi) 6= ∅
when qi leads to a complete query. However, we observe that even a prefix of qi is sufficient
to determine that any query with that prefix is not possible to pass the sanitizer. Suppose p is
a prefix of qi. If Lv ∩ L(p.∗) == ∅ (p.∗ denotes p concatenated with any string), then it is
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clear that Lv ∩ L(qi) == ∅. In the process of enumerating SQL queries from SQL grammar,
we indeed maintain the prefix of SQL queries. Therefore, instead of checking whether an SQL
query passes the sanitizer after it is generated, we proactively check whether there is any query
that has the same prefix can pass the sanitizer. If all the queries with the same prefix cannot pass
the sanitizer, we do not generate any queries with that prefix. In other words, whenever we can
be certain that a query is not able to pass the sanitizer, we stop putting any effort to generate it
in our query generation process.
As an example, suppose the program contains a sanitizer which blocks the keyword “OR”.
Instead of generating many queries in such form
1 SELECT STAR FROM ID WHERE ID EQ ID OR ID SEMI
2 SELECT STAR FROM ID WHERE ID EQ ID OR ID AND ID SEMI
3 SELECT STAR FROM ID WHERE ID EQ ID OR ID AND ID EQ ID SEMI
4 . . .
We could quickly conclude that any query with prefix SELECT STAR FROM ID WHERE ID
EQ ID OR will not pass the sanitizer. Hence, none of the above queries would be generated.
3.4 Evaluation
We have implemented SQLR on the Linux system. We evaluated SQLR on several vulnerable
PHP applications that contain custom sanitizing routines. In our evaluation, we used the SQL
grammar specification from the SQLlite [44] implementation, which has 141 terminals, 112
non-terminals, 330 rules, and 630 states.
3.4.1 Generating New Attack Patterns
Since our approach uses the SQL grammar as a guide, it can systematically enumerate malicious
SQL queries. In our evaluation, it generated lots of surprising attack patterns. Some of the
patterns are even not semantically meaningful to a human. However, they resulted in malicious
behaviors in the database when we actually tested them in a database server.
For the purpose of generating new attack patterns, we start with two simple symbolic queries,
i.e., “SELECT * FROM user table WHERE username=SymbolicPart” and “UPDATE
user table SET password=SymbolicPart”, where SymbolicPart denotes the symbolic
part of the query. We run our implementation on the symbolic queries to enumerate queries with
different parsing trees. A threshold is defined to limit the length of the inputs to be generated.
For example, if we want to generate queries with no more than 5 SQL keywords from the
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1 SELECT * FROM user_table WHERE username ='' < 2;
2 SELECT * FROM user_table WHERE username = '' = '';
3 SELECT * FROM user_table WHERE username = EXISTS (SELECT distinct * FROM user_table
WHERE - ˜ null);
4 SELECT * FROM user_table WHERE username = EXISTS (SELECT distinct * FROM user_table
WHERE not not username);
5 SELECT * FROM user_table WHERE username= + - EXISTS (SELECT distinct * FROM user_table
WHERE username);
6 SELECT * FROM user_table WHERE username='' + - EXISTS (SELECT distinct username +
password FROM user_table WHERE user_name + NULL);
7 SELECT * FROM user_table WHERE username='' < 1 HAVING username < 1;
8 UPDATE user_table set password='' WHERE username='' & 1;
9 UPDATE user_table set password='' WHERE username='' / 1;
10 UPDATE user_table set password='' WHERE username='' < 2;
Figure 3.5: Attack patterns generated by SQLR.
Name (version) Sanitizer Size§ Grammar Size∗ Vulnerable Sinks Vulnerable Sanitizer Detected
Schoolmate (1.5.4) 17 27 5 Yes
PhpFusion (6.00.110) 11 85 2 Yes
PhpBB (2.0.10) 5 306 2 Yes
Webchess (1.0) 4 7 12 Yes
Extcal (2.0) 3 11 7 Yes
Phpsqlitecms (1.0) 3 6 10 Yes
GeCCBBlite (1.0) 4 7 2 Yes
§ Sanitizer size is measured by the number of lines. ∗Grammar size is measured by the number of production rules
Table 3.2: Evaluation Results.
symbolic part of the symbolic query, we set the threshold to 5.
In Figure 3.5, we show some of the attack queries1 generated using our approach with a
threshold of 5. SQLR generated previously unreported patterns of SQL injection attacks. When
the queries are sent to the database server, the conditions in the WHERE clause are always
evaluated to true.
3.4.2 Effectiveness in Validating Sanitizers
We evaluated the effectiveness of SQLR in validating sanitizers. We selected 7 real-world open-
source web applications from Sourceforge: Schoolmate v1.5.4, PhpFusion v6.00.110, PhpBB
v2.0.10, Webchess v1.0, Extcal v2, Phpsqlitecms v1.0, and GeCCBBlite v1.0. Some of these
programs have been used for evaluation in existing solutions [12]. In each of these programs,
there is custom sanitizing code that is used to detect SQLi inputs. To validate these sanitizers,
we used SQLR on the web applications and generated attack SQL queries. We sent the gen-
erated malicious queries to the database and manually verified that they did result in malicious
activities, i.e., corruption or unintended disclosure of data.
The result of our evaluation is shown in Table 3.2. For each program, the table shows the
number of lines in the sanitizer code, the size of the sanitizer’s context free grammar generated
by PHPSA, the number of sinks that use this sanitizer, and the attacks detected. A sink is
1The attack patterns was successfully executed on database running MYSQL.
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vulnerable if there is path from input source to the vulnerable point (SQL Query execution)
through vulnerable sanitizing code. For example, in Schoolmate we have 5 vulnerable sinks
because it has 5 different vulnerable points in the program and all the sinks are reached from
sanitizing code. Now, we discuss the evaluation of each program in more detail.
Schoolmate is a PHP/MySQL solution for high schools to manage assignments and grades
of the students. It contains a function coverttodb in DBfunction.php, which is used to con-
vert dates into database format. This function does not check whether the user-supplied input
contains characters other than numbers. This function is used in the files Manageterms.php,
ManagerGrades.php, which are vulnerable to SQLi attacks. The sanitized input is used in the
UPDATE statement which modifies the value in the database. Therefore, we enumerate all
possible queries for the UPDATE statement and generate attack patterns.
PhpFusion is a light-weight content management system which contains a sanitizing func-
tion in file maincore.php and setuser.php, which checks if the input string contains the keywords
“OR” and “=” in user inputs. SQLR generated SQL injection attacks that do not require “OR”
and “=” keywords, similar to those in Figure 3.5.
PhpBB,a bulletin board contains a vulnerability in the file viewtopic.php, which allows arbi-
trary PHP code to be executed on the server. The sanitizing code involves an improper combina-
tion of the htmlspecialchars and urldecode functions, along with dynamically evaluated
PHP code embedded within a call to str replace, which performs a search-and-replace on a
string using regular expression matching.
Extcal is a multi-user web-based calendar application which contains a vulnerability in
register.php, cal search.php and 5 more files. The sanitizing function used in this pro-
gram is the addslashes function. It also checks if the length of the input is greater than 3. We
use the technique presented in [45] to bypass the addslashes function. Attack pattern longer
than three can be generated easily using our technique.
Phpsqlitecms, a web content management system uses sqlite escape string function
as the sanitizer in 10 files. This function replaces (')(single quote) with ('')(double quote). It can
be bypassed using the following attack pattern generated by SQLR.
SELECT id, name, pw, type, editor_type FROM user_table where lower(name) = `abc\'' <
2;--';
The trick here is to submit the user input as (abc \'< 2;–) and sqlite escape string function will
change the input into (abc \''< 2;–).
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Sanitizing Function Grammar Size Time Number of Queries Generated
w*(')( )(O)(R) 32 251m20s 1028
w*(')( )(H)(A)(V)(I)(N)(G) 64 252m.41s 1033
w*(')( )(O)(R)(D)(E)(R)( )(B)(Y) 73 257m12s 1073
w*(')( )(U)(N)(I)(O)(N)( )(S)(E)(L)(E)(C)(T) 105 236m40s 901
Table 3.3: Performance Evaluation with Threshold 4
Both Webchess(a server for playing chess over the Internet) and GeccBBlite(a weblog/-
portal) use the same sanitizing function that checks if the input string is empty or not. If the
string is not empty it executes the query in the database. This type of simple sanitizer was
bypassed using SQLR.
3.4.3 Performance
We evaluated the performance of SQLR using a computer with dual core 3.2 GHz Pentium
processor and 4 GB of memory, running Linux Kernel 2.6.38. Our sample sanitizer checks for
SQLi patterns including “UNION SELECT”, “ORDER BY” and, “HAVING”. We evaluated
our system performance on validating these sanitizers.
The results are shown in Table 3.3. In the table, each sanitizing function is converted into a
context-free grammar by PHPSA and total number of production rules in this grammar is shown
in the table. We show the time taken to generate all queries of threshold 4 using the symbolic
model of the sanitizer. We also present the number of queries generate using our approach. For
example, we have a sanitizing function that checks for ‘HAVING’ keyword in the user input.
PHPSA converted this sanitizer into a context-free grammar of 64 production rules. Using this
sanitizer model and the threshold 4, we generate 1033 malicious queries in 252 minutes and 41
seconds.
We also measure the time for the evaluation in Table 3.3. After the attack patterns are gener-
ated, the time taken to detect vulnerability in the sanitizing ranges from 5-30(minutes) excluding
the time for generating attack patterns.
3.5 Case Study with Web Scanners
In this section, we analyze black-box web application vulnerability scanners which are auto-
mated tools that probe web applications for security vulnerabilities. In order to assess the newly
generated SQL attack patterns using SQLR, we obtained access to three open-source tools:
w3af (1.0) (Web Application Attack and Audit Framework) is an open-source web applica-
tion security scanner used to test vulnerabilities in Web applications; wapiti (2.2.1) allows
to audit the security of web applications and checks for SQLi attacks and; sqlmap (0.9) is an
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/* sanitization function using general attack patterns */
if((!pre_match("/' or /",$_POST['txtNick']) && !preg_match("/ union /", $_POST['txtNick'])) && 
(!preg_match("/ or  /",$_POST['pwdPassword']) && !preg_match("/ union /",$_POST['pwdPassword']))) {
/* vulnerable sink */ 
$tmpQuery = "SELECT * FROM players WHERE  nick = '"





(a) Vulnerable sink that cannot be detected by Web scanners
1) <username field> = ' + - exists(select distinct nick + password from players where password + NULL);--
2) <username field> = ' < 1 HAVING nick < 1 ; --
3) ' < 2; --
4) ' = ' '; --
5) <username filed> = ' + - exists (select distinct * from players where - ~ null);--





















Without sanitizers X X X X X
With sanitizers 7 7 7 7 X
Table 3.4: Comparison of our attack patterns with the attack patterns of existing Web Scanner
tools using Webchess 0.9. Xmeans SQLi detected, and 7means SQLi undetected.
open source penetration testing tool that automates the process of detecting and exploiting SQL
injection flaws. We also tested on three commercial tools: AcunetixWeb Vulnerability
Scanner, IBM Rational AppScan and HP WebInspect. Using the above six blackbox
penetration tools, we use webchess (0.9) PHP application (discussed in previous section)
and provide a sanitization function using the general attack patterns. These sanitization func-
tions are meant to provide protection from SQLi attacks. To test the effectiveness of these
sanitization functions we use those three tools. In Table 3.4, we list out the how these tools
perform with sanitization function using general patterns and also you can see that webchess
is still vulnerable from SQLi attack with our attack patterns shown in Figure 3.5.
The sanitization function and the list of attack patterns used in this evaluation is described
in Figure 3.6. In Figure 3.6(a), the vulnerability sink in Line 5 cannot be detected by the
web scanners. However, using the attack patterns shown Figure 3.6(b), the vulnerability sink




Weak Authentication Systems (WAS)
In this chapter, we present WeakAutoScan, a tool to systematically find flaws in the authentica-
tion protocol implementations. Section 4.1 details the problem with existing blackbox scanners;
Section 4.2 gives an overview of our solution; Section 4.3 describes details of the implementa-
tion and evaluation of our approach.
In our approach we assume that the Security analyst can only observe the network traffic and
code execution at the browser end; the server side logic of the authentication protocol is not
available for analysis.
4.1 Problems with existing Scanners
Web application scanners typically consist of two main modules: a crawler module and an
attacker module, as shown in Figure 4.1. The crawling component is allowed to fetch a set
of URLs, retrieves the corresponding pages, and follows links and redirects to identify all the
reachable pages in the application. The attacker module analyzes the URLs discovered by the
crawler and the corresponding input points. Then, for each input and for each vulnerability type
for which the web application vulnerability scanner tests, the attacker module generates values
that are likely to trigger a vulnerability. For example, the attacker module would attempt to
inject strings that have a special meaning in the SQL language, when testing for SQL injec-
tion vulnerabilities. Input values are usually defined in the attack vectors generated using SQL
injection cheat-sheets [46].
The authentication mechanism is the common feature that is found in most web sites. Be-
cause this is so prevalent, scanners must properly handle authentication, possibly by creating
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Figure 4.1: Traditional Blackbox Scanner
In Figure 4.1, we show that existing blackbox scanners fail to handle authentication systems.
When the scanner tries to crawl the web server which has authentication pages, it fails to fetch
because most web applications require a user to create an account in order to utilize the services
offered. Hence, the scanners fails to analyze and report for any implementation flaw in the au-
thentication system. In a recent study, it is shown that current blackbox scanners fail to handle
authentication [4].
4.2 Overview of our approach
Figure 4.2 illustrates the overview of our approach which consists of three components WeakAuth-
Scan, Web Mail Service (WMS), and Web Authentication System (WAS). WeakAuthScan is the
main component which automatically extract the authentication protocols logic by analyzing
the HTTP messages exchanged between the scanner and the web server. We use the traditional
blackbox scanner approach with additional components to support authentication. WeakAuth-
Scan consists of two modules - a crawler module and an attacker module. The crawler module
is similar to those in the traditional blackbox scanner approach (discussed in previous section)
and attacker module analyzes the URLs discovered by the crawler and reports if there is an
implementation flaw in the authentication protocol.
The WeakAuthScan component first communicates with the WMS component to request for
temporary email ID creation and WMS responds back with the “email-ID message. For our
scanner to analyze the authentication implementation logic, it has to first create an account on
WAS. Creating an account can be done using the “email-ID generated from WMS component.
Once the scanner creates an account, WAS responds back with two messages - (a) a success-
ful message to WeakAuthScan for account creation and (b) a mail addressed to the “email-ID
(on WMS) and this mail contains a special URL that allows the user/scanner to connect the
server and activates the users login session in the server automatically. One advantage using
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Figure 4.2: Overview of WeakAutoScan.
Such mechanisms are termed as ’AutoAuth’ and now-a-days many websites use this method
to authenticate user. Once WAS send a mail to the “email-ID we use the crawler module to
crawl WMS and use our analysis module to extract the URLs sent from WAS to WMS. These
URLs contains HTTP parameters which are used to authenticate a user. We analyze these pa-
rameter values either by human or we automatically check whether these parameter values are
generated using a sequential algorithm listed in the Online Integer Sequences Encyclopedia [47]
or in Wolfram Aplha [48]. Once we find out the logic used to generate the parameter values,
WeakAuthScan create a new AutoAuth link and upon successful it produces a vulnerability
report.
4.3 Evaluation
We tested on two popular websites, where users share deeply personal information, both of
which have from hundreds of thousands to millions of users and utilize weak authorization
mechanism. WeakAutoScan successfully uncovered the authentication protocol for both sites.
4.3.1 Online dating sites
Meeting Millionaire is one of the top 10 dating website in the world [49]. The vulnerability
exists in one of the link which is sent by the server to unsubscribe from the mailing list. This
link contains the information of username, password, contact details of a particular member. For




‘http : //app.icontact.com′ is an email marketing solution used by ‘Meeting Millionaire’
[49] for maintaining the contact information of its members. Here, in this link the parameters
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’c’,’l’,’m’ is all constants for the Meeting Millionaire website. Icontact.com provides services
for many such websites and these fields are different for each site. The parameter ’r’ is used to
verify which user has sent this request and its value is incremented with arithmetic value. And
finally the parameter ’s’ consists of 4 character from the set [A-Z 0-9]. If we want to generate
a valid ’s’ field value for a different member then we need to generate total of 364 combination
and test which one is valid. Using our approach, we are able to successfully generate legitimate
URL’s and also capture the username/password for that particular member.
4.3.2 Online Matrimony Site
IyerMatrimony [50] website is a part of CommunityMatrimony which ranks 6096th in Alexa’s
most popular websites in India and contains millions of user accounts. The vulnerability in this
site can allow attacker to get into any user account without the password. This vulnerability
can be exploited by understanding the communication between the server and user. When user
registers for a new account using his email address, the server sends a link to the user’s email
and on clicking the link will allow user to login into his account. This link contains 5 parameters
and among these only 3 fields are required to authenticate the user. To understand how these
parameters are generated, we use 10MinutesMail [51] to generate many email accounts and
these accounts are used to create new accounts on IyerMatrimony. We write a Perl script to
automatically create new accounts and extract those three important parameters associated for
each user. We confirm that the parameters generated for consecutive user accounts follows a
sequential algorithm like incrementing the parameters value by a constant number or algorithms
listed in the Online Integer Sequences Encyclopedia [47].
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
We studied the vulnerabilities on SQL Injection and Weak Authentication Systems that cur-
rent black-box scanners fail to detect. In this thesis, we first present SQLR(SQLi Revisited)
to systematically validate input sanitizers of SQLi attacks. Second, we present a framework
called WeakAuthScan a semi-automated method to validate flaws in the authentication protocol
implementation.
SQLR is used to systematically validate SQL injection sanitizers in a web application. Our
approach is unique in that it uses the SQL grammar to guide a comprehensive validation process.
Specifically, our approach traverses the enhanced SQL parsing graph and enumerates malicious
SQL queries that can be generated possibly by the web application. The malicious queries are
then used by a model of the web application sanitizer to detect vulnerabilities in the sanitizer.
Our approach also summaries the enumerated malicious queries into attack patterns that can be
used to improve existing sanitizer validators. We evaluated our solution using real-word web
applications and also on popular web vulnerability scanners. Our approach generated new attack
patterns and successfully detected vulnerabilities in these sanitizers.
WeakAuthScan is an end-to-end scanner to semi-automatically recover authentication proto-
col logic from its implementation and verify if it contains security flaws. WeakAuthScan requires
no knowledge of the protocol specifications. We successfully detected security vulnerability on
two popular real-world applications.
As shown by our experimental result, black-box scanners are not complete and they fail
to detect SQLi and cannot detect flaws in the authentication implementations. In future, we
plan to enhance our WeakAuthScan method, using white-box testing (analyzing javascript) in
the authentication process. We also use verification tools to verify the security properties on
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